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THE SALE, LEASE OR EXCHANGE OF INDIAN
WATER RIGHTS FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction: Why Indian water rights

are important in the development of
energy resources.
A. The fact that water is a scarce
commodity in the western portion of the
United States becomes a more critical
problem as the West progresses
with increased development of its vast
energy resources.
B.

The existence of paramount water

rights appurtenant to Indian reservations
make Indian water rights a prime source
for the firm water supply so desperately
needed in the development of western energy
resources.
C.

Before moving to the specific

subject of the sale, lease or exchange of
Indian water for energy development, it
seems appropriate to review the law relating
to Indian water rights and the right of
Indian tribal government to regulate and
control their water rights.
D. With this formulation, it is thus
logical to consider the manner in which
organizations contemplating energy development may enter into agreements with
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Indian tribes to acquire authority
through sale, lease or exchange, to use
Indian water to meet their need for a
firm water supply for energy development

in the West.
II. A historical review of the federal law
establishing the paramount rights of
Indians to the use of water.
A. General attributes of Indian water
rights.
1. An Indian water right arises under
Federal law. In nearly all cases it comes
into being with a reservation is created,
whether the act of creation is a treaty, an
act of Congress, or an executive order, and
it pertains to lands within the reservation.
2. No diversion of water and application
to beneficial use is necessary for the creation
• of an Indian water, right: The right arises
no later than the date the reservation is
established, although the first use of water
is much later in time. Moreover, no application for a permit to appropriate water need
be made to a State official in order to create
an Indian water right because the right
stems from federal law. State regulation on
initiation of use, purpose, place and manner
of use, and forfeiture of the right are
inapplicable to Indian water rights.
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3. The priority rules of appropriation
law do not apply to Indian water rights.
Ordinary appropriation rights date their
priority from the time of use or from the

date of permit; Indian water rights have
priority at least from the date the
reservation was established.
a. An Indian reservation established
in 1868 which commences its first use of
water in 1982 has, in times of shortage,
a right to receive water ahead of any nonIndian water right with a priority date
after 1868.
B. The legal principles governing
Indian water rights and the reasons
behind them were established by the
United States Supreme Court and refined by
the lower Federal courts.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court case of
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1903), is the foundation on which the
law of Indian water rights rests.
a. Significant facts of the case-The United States sued on behalf of the
Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation
to enjoin upstream diversions that
interfered with the flow of 120 cubic
feet per second of water necessary for
X-3

irrigating pasture and farm land on
the Reservation. The defense was that
the defendants has acquired a water
right under State law by diverting and

applying water to beneficial use prior
to any use of water on the Reservation.
The defense was that the defendants
had acquired a water right under State
law by diverting and applying water to
beneficial use prior to any use of water
on the Reservation. The defendants
claimed that under Montana law and Western
water law generally, they were prior
appropriators with the superior right.
b. The Supreme Court decided two
significant issues in Winters which has
since become the doctrinial bases for
Indian water rights--The first issue
was whether the Federal Government had
the power to create a water right for
an Indian Reservation. The second issue
arose after the Court answered the first
issue in the affirmative and involved
whether the Federal Government exercised
their power when they established the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.
(i) The Court in deciding the
issue of power stated:
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The power of the government to
reserve the waters and excempt
them from appropriation under the

state laws is not denied, and could
not be. [Citations omitted.] That
the government did reserve them
we have decided, and for a use
which would be necessarily continued
through the years. This was done
May 1, 1888 [the Reservation was
established by an agreement with
the Indians.***]
(ii) In deciding the issue of the
exercise of power the court

laid the

foundation for Indian voter rights:
The case, as we view it, turns on
the agreement of May, 1888, resulting
in the creation of Fort Belknap
Reservation. In the construction of
this agreement there are certain
elements to be considered that are
prominent and significant. The
reservation was a part of a very
much larger tract which the Indians
ha a the right to occupy and use and
which was adequate for the habits and
wants of a nomadic and uncivilized
people. It was the policy of the
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Government, it was the desire of
of the Indians, to change those
habits and to become a pastoral
and civilized people. If they should

become such the original tract was too
extensive, but a smaller tract would
be inadequate without a change of
conditions. The lands were arid
and, without irrigation, were
practically valueless. The Indians
had command of the lands and the
waters--command of all their
beneficial use, whether kept for
hunting, 'and grazing roving herds
of stock,' or turned to agriculture
and the arts of civilization. Did
they give up all this? Did they
reduce the area of their occupation
and give up the waters which made
it valuable or adequate *** If it
were possible to believe affirmative
answers, we might also believe that
the Indians were awed by the power
of the Government or deceived by its
negotiators. Neither view is
possible. The Government is asserting the right of the Indians. But
extremes need not be taken into
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account. By a rule of interpretation
of agreements and treaties with
the Indians, ambiguities occurring

will be resolved from the standpoint
of the Indians. And the rule should
certainly be applied to determine
between two inferences, one of which
would support the purpose of the
agreement and the other impair or
defeat it. On account of their
relations to the Government, it cannot be supposed that the Indians
were alert to exclude by formal
words every inference which might
militate against sr defeat the
declared purpose of themselves and
the Government, even if it could be
supposed that they had the intelligence
to foresee the 'double sense' which
might some time be urged against
them.' 207 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1908).
(iii) Following Winters, the Supreme
Court did not discuss significant aspects
of Indian water rights for more than 50
years. The only Supreme Court opinion
during the period was United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939), holding

that allotted lands sold to non-Indians
X-7

shared in the water supply reserved
for the Reservation. The Court did
not consider the nature and extent of
Indian water rights, noting, "The
present proceeding is not properly
framed to that end." 305 U.S. at 533.
However, the lower Federal courts did
begin to refine the concepts underlying
Indian water rights and struggled with
the difficult question of admeasurement
of the quantity of the entitlement.
It is unnecessary to review all the
cases for our purposes. See United
States v. Ahtanum In. D., 236 F.2d
321 (9th Cir. 1956), on second appeal
330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Walker River Irr. D., 104 F.2d
334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v.
McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939)
Skeem v. United States, 273 Fed. 93 (9th
cir. 1921); Conrad Investment Co. v.
United States, 161 Fed. 829 (9th Cir.
1908); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d
909 (D. Ida. 1928).
2. In 1963, the Supreme Court
of the United States addressed for the
second time the question of the nature
and extent of Indian water rights. In
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reaffirming the Winters doctrine in
•Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), the Supreme
Court clarified substantially the
question of quantification of Indian
water rights.
a.

The Special Master had rejected

both an open ended decree, which would have
the vices of uncertainty and lack of
finality, and final quantification based
on projected water requirements on the
Reservations, which would have the vice
of all projections in granting too much
or too little depending on the actuality
of the future. Instead, the Master
adopted as the full and final measure
of water rights for the Reservations the
amoutn of water necessary to irrigate the
practicably irrigable acreage on the
Reservations.
b.

The Supreme Court affirmed this

formula, stating:
We also agree with the Master's
conclusion as to the quantity of
• water intended to be reserved. He
found that the water was intended
to satisfy the future as well as
the present needs of the Indian
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reservations and ruled that enough
water was reserved to irrigate all the
practicably irrigable acreage on the
reservations. Arizona, on the other

hand, contends that the quantity of
water reserved should be measured
by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable
needs,' which, in fact, means by thefl
number of Indians. How many Indians
there will be can only be guessed.
We have concluded, as did the Master,
that the only feasible and fair way
by which their future uses will be can
only be guessed. We have concluded,
as did the Master, that the only
feasible and fair way by which reserved
water for the reservations can be measured
is irrigable acreage. The various
acreages of irrigable land which the
Master found to be on the different
reservations we find to be reasonable.
373 U.S. at 600-01.
c. Although Arizona v. California
indicates that "practicably irrigable
acreage" is the appropriate formula
for measuring the quantity of Indian
• water rights for Reservations on
which farming and ranching were
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expected to take place, other Indian
Reservations created for other types of
occupations may have water rights
measured by different formulas.
The general principle seems to be
that stated in Winters, that the
rule of interpretation of agreements
with Indian Nations is that "which
would support the purpose of the agreement."
Thus, the United States now seeks a decree
on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Indians
of sufficient water to maintain the Lake
and its fisheries. United States and
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. TruckeeCarson Irrigation District, 649 F.2d
1286 (1981).
3. More recent Supreme Court cases
have reaffirmed the Federal Reserved
water rights found to exist in Winters
and Arizona v. California.
a.

Congress has the power to reserve

unappropriated water for use on appurtenant
lands withdrawn from the public domain for
specific federal purposes. United States
v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 57 L.Ed.2d
1052 (1978).
b.

Where water is needed to accomplish

those purposes, a reservation of appurtenant

water is implied. Id at 700; Cappaert
v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139,
48 L. Ed.2d 523 (1976).
c.

The supreme Court in New Mexico,

held:
Where water is necessary to fulfill
the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of
Congress' express deference to state
water law in other areas, that the
United States intended to reserve
the necessary water. Where water
is only valuable for a secondary
use of the reservation, however, there
arises the contrary inference that
Congress intended, consistent with
its other views, that the United
States would acquire water in the
same manner as any other public
or private appropriator.
United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. at 702.
Under this holding, the Supreme Court
has limited the reservation of water to
the primary purposes for which a federal
reservation was created.
d.

Indian reserved water rights
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may be used for purposes other than
which they were originally quantified.
(i) The special master in Arizona
v. California determined that the

purposes for which the reservation was
created governed the quantification of
reserved water, but not the use of such
water:
This [method of quantifying water
rights] does not necessarily
mean, however, that water reserved
for Indian Reservations may not be
used for purposes other than agricultural and related uses . . • •
The measurement used in defining
the magnitude of the water rights
is the amount of water necessary for
agriculture and related purposes
because this was the initial purpose
of the reservation, but the decree
establishes a property right which
the United States may utilize or
dispose of for the benefit of the
Indians as the relevant law may allow.
Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special
Master, to the Supreme Court 265-66
(December 5, 1960) (emphasis added).
(ii) The Department of Interior has
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taken the position that a change of
use is permissible. See Memorandum
from Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior to the Secretary of the
Interior, February 1, 1964(use of
reserved water for recreation and
housing development).
III. The right of Indian Tribal
Governments to regulate and control
Indian water rights.
A. The concept of Indian Tribal
sovereignty is deeply rooted in federal
law, having been first pronounced
by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), where the
Cherokee Nation was held to have retained
authority over its lands and all persons
within its boundaries to the exclusion
of the laws of the State of Georgia.
1. The Supreme Court, in 1973, in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm.,
cast aside an argument that tribal
sovereignty no longer exists. 411
U.S. 164, 170-72 (1973).
2.

In the case of United States

v. MazuLie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), the
Supreme Court explained more fully tribal
authority.
a. The central question there was
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whether two tribes, co-owners of a
reservation, had authority, by express
delegation from Congress or by virtue of
their sovereignty, to regulate the
activities of non-Indians on fee
patented land within the Indian reservation.
(i) The Court held:
It is an important aspect of this
case that Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes
of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory [citing
Worcester]; they are 'a separate
people' possessing 'the power of
regulating their internal and social
relations. . . •'"
419 U.S. 544, 557 (1973)
3. The sovereignty that the Indian
tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at
the sufferance of Congress and is
subject to complete defeasance. But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their existing sovereign powers. In
sum, Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication
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as a necessary result of their dependent
status.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323, 98 s.ct. 1079, 1086, 55 L.Ed. 2d
303 (1978) (citations omitted).
4. A tribe's inherent power to
regulate generally the conduct of nonmembers on land no longer owned by, or
held in trust for the tribe was impliedly
withdrawn as a necessary result of its
dependent status. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), 101 S.Ct.
1245, 1257, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981).
Exceptions to this implied withdrawal
exist. A tribe retains the inherent
power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the
health and welfare of the tribe. Id.
This includes conduct that involves the
tribe's water rights. See id. at n. 15.
5. Regulatory authority over
reservation Indians resides exclusively
with the federal government and the Indian
tribes.
a. Tribal powers are based on
inherent sovereignty. United States
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v. Wheeler, 345 U.S. 313 (1978).
b. Federal authority to regulate the
use of water based on 25 U.S.0 §381.
(i) The extent of the Secretary's
authority under this statute has not been
addressed by the courts.
6. In the case of Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647
F.2d 42 (1981) the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether
the States had jurisdiction over nonIndian water users within the boundaries
of a reservation.
a.

The Walton case arose from a

dispute as to the rights to water to
a creek and basin which is located
entirely within the boundaries of the
Colville Indian Reservation in the state
of Washington. Walton, a non-Indian
was irrigating, by pumping, from the
creek. He had purchased three allottments
and claimed a reserved right as well
as a state right to irrigate his land.
b.

In deciding the issue of state

juLisdiction the Court stated:
We hold that state regulation of
water in the No Name system was
preempted by the creation of the
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Colville Reservation. The
geographic facts of this case
make resolution of this issue
somewhat easier than It otherwise

might be. The No Name system is
non-navigable and is entirely
within the boundaries of the
reservation. Although some of the
water passes through lands now in
in non-Indian ownership, all of
those lands are also entirely
within the reservation boundaries.
(i) The Supreme Court has held that
water use on a federal reservation is
not subject to state regulation absent
explicit federal recognition of state
authority. Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 75 S.Ct. 832, 99

L.Ed. 1215 (1955). The Supreme Court
stated:
It is familiar principle of
public land law that statutes
providing generally for disposal
of the public domain are inapplicable
to lands which are not unqualifiedly
subject to sale and disposition
because they have been appropriated
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for some other purpose. . . . [lit
is enough for the instant case, to
recognize that these Acts do not
apply to this license, which relates
only to the use of waters on reservations of the United States. 349 U.S.
at 448, 75 S.Ct. at 840 (citations
omitted).
(ii) In United States v. McIntire,
101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1934), the
Court held that state water laws are not
controlling on an Indian reservation:
[T]he Montana statutes regarding
water rights are not applicable,
because Congress at no time has made
such statutes controlling in the
reservation. In fact, the Montana
enabling act specifically provided
that Indian lands within the limits
of the state, 'shall remain under
the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States.'
Identical language appears in the Washington Enabling Act, Ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676,
677 (1889).
(iii) The Court adhered to its holding
in McIntire because it found no indication
Congress intended the state to have the
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power.
(iv) Where land is set aside for an
Indian reservation, Congress has reserved
it for federal, as opposed to state needs.
Because the No Name System is located
entirely within the reservation, state
regulation of some portion of its waters
would create the jurisdictional confusion
Congress has sought to avoid.
(v) Public Law 280, Act of August
15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, did not delegate
this regulatory power to the state.
Nor did this court perceive the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. 5666, as expanding
the state's regulatory powers over water
on a federal reservation.
(vi) The Court noted that the state's
interest in extending its water law to
the reservation is limited in this case.
Tribal or federal control of No Name
waters will have no impact on state water
rights off the reservation.
(vii) The Court concluded that
Walton's state permits were of no force
and effect.
B. The question of tribal regulatory
powers over water uses within reservations
has only recently been decided by the
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courts. See Colville -Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, at 52
(1981). In holding that the tribe's
regulatory authority over water was
governed by the principles governing
tribal powers generally, the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
Regulation of water on a reservation
is critical to the lifestyle of its
residents and the development of its
resources. Especially in arid and
semi-arid regions of the West, water
is the lifeblood of the community.
Its regulation is an important
sovereign power.
Although we need not decide
whether this power resides exclusively
in the tribe or the federal government
or whether it may be exercised by them
jointly, its importance forms the
backdrop for our consideration of the
pre-emption issue. Id. at 52.
1. Tribes may be able to attach
conditions to the use of reserved waters
and to establish procedures for obtaining
the right to use such waters.
IV. The authority of Indian Tribes
to enter into agreements for the sale,
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lease, or exchange of their water rights.
A. The authority of an Indian tribe to
sell its Indian water right is dependent
upon a federal statute authorizing such sale.
1.

There are no general federal statutes

that authorize the sale of Indian water
rights separate and apart from the land.
Congress was urged to do so by the National
Water Commission. Nat'l Water Comm'n, Water
Policies for the Future - Final Report to
the President, 481 (Washington Government
Printing Office, 1973).
2. The Nonintercourse Act prohibits
any conveyance of Indian land without federal
consent. See Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat.
729, 25 U.S.C. §177. Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-70
(1974).
a. As a general proposition the word
"land" in statutes of this type has been
construed to include appurtenant waters.
Holmes v. Unites States, 53 F.2d 960
(10th Cir. 1931).
3. The-Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue. In United States

V. Ahtanum Irrig. Dist., 236 F.2d 321
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
988 (1957) (Ahtanum I), and United States
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v. Antanum Irriq. Dist., 330 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
924 (1965) (Ahtanum

11), the court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered
the validity of an agreement entered into
by the Secretary of the Interior that
left the Indians with 25% of the flow of
Ahtanum Creek and gave 75% to the nonIndian landowners on the other side.
The agreement was analogized to a boundary
line adjustment in Ahtanum I and found to be
within the Secretary's general powers of
supervision and management over Indian
affairs delegated in 25 U.S.C. §§2, 9. See
236 F.2d at 335-36; 330 F.2d at 902-03.
In Ahtanum II, the Court of Appeals
expressly disclaimed having held that the
Secretary was authorized to convey Indian
water rights and indicated that if that had
been the issue it would have concluded
that the Secretary lacked the power.
Id. at 903. Subsequent decisions narrowly
construing the Secretary's powers under 25
U.S.C. §§2,9, and strictly enforcing the
Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. §177, have
undercut the limited extent to which the
Secretary's general management powers
were upheld in the Ahtanum decisions.
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Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
Escondido Mutual Water Co., No.69-217-S
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1980). See
Organized Village of Kake V. Egan,
369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962); United States v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d
676, 697-99 (9th Cir. 1976).
5. Although the case law is not
conclusive, it is my advise, based on
3 and 4 supra, that potential water
users who plan to use "conveyed" Indian
water should obtain congressional
authorization.
B. The authority of Indian allottees
to sell the reserved water rights's
appurtenant to their allotments.
1. The General Allotment Act of 1887
provided that land on reservations could
be allotted for the exclusive use of
individual Indians. Remaining land was
to be made available for homesteading
by non-Indians. After holding allotted
lands in trust for individual Indians
for a 25-year period, the federal
goverLment could convey the land to the
allottee in fee, "discharged of said
trust and free of all charge or incumbrance
whatsoever." 25 U.S.C. §348.
X-24

a.

Because the use of reserved

water is not limited to fulfilling
the original purposes of the reservation,
Congress had the power to allot reserved

water rights to individual Indians,
and to allow for the transfer of such
rights to non-Indians. Whether it did
so is a question of congressional intent.
b.

The only reference to water

rights in the Act is found in section 7:
In cases where the use of water
for irrigation is necessary to render
the lands within any Indian reservation
available for agricultural purposes,
the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to prescribe such rules
and regulations to prescribe such
rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary to secure a just and
equal distribution thereof among
the Indians residing upon any such
reservation; and no other
appropriation or grant of water
by an riparian proprietor shall be
authorized or permitted to the damage
of any other riparian proprietor.
25 U.S.C. §381.
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c. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Allotment Act
suggesting that Congress gave any
consideration to the transferability of

reserved water rights.
2. Indian allottees' right to use
reserved waters was determined in United
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527.
a. "When allotments were made for
exclusive use and thereafter conveyed
in fee, the right to use some portion
of tribal waters essential for cultivation passed to the owners." Id. at 532.
•

3. The general rule is that termination
or diminuation of Indian rights requires

• express legislation or a clear inference of
Congressional intent gleaned from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative
history. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 392-93 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1972).
4. In Walton, supra, at 50, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
an Indian allottee may sell his right to
reserved water. In so holding, the
Court stated:
a. By placing allotted lands in
trust for 25 years, Congress evinced
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an intent to protect Indians by
preventing transfer of those lands.
But there is no basis for an inference
that some restrictions survived
beyond the trust period. Congress
provided for extensions of the trust
period, but directed that fee title
be conveyed to the allottee when
the period expired. We think the
fee included the appurtenant right
to share in reserved waters, and see
no basis for limiting the transferability of that right.
b. The full quantity of water available to the Indian allottee thus may
be conveyed to the non-Indian
purchaser. There is no diminution
in the right the Indian may convey.
We think Congress would have intended,
however, that the non-Indian purchaser,
under no competitive disability visa-vis other water users, may not retain
the right to that quantity of water
despite non-use. See United States
v. Adair, 478 F.Supp. at 348-49;
United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d at
912. Id. at 51.
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c. Under the general leasing statute,
Indian tribes and individual Indians
may lease their land and appurtenant
water rights. skeem v. United states,
273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
•

1. Congress has authorized the leasing

of "any restricted Indian lands, whether
tribally or individually owned,. . .
with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior." 25 U.S.C. §415(a).
a. Section 415(a) provides:
Any restricted Indian lands. . .
may be leased by the Indian owners,
with the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, for public, religious,
educational, recreational, residential,
or business purposes, including
the development or utilization of
•

natural resources in connection with
operations under such leases. . . ."
(emphasis added).
(i) This language permits a water

right appurtenant to the land to be
included in,the lease.
2. There is no general federal
statute authorizing the leasing of
Indian water rights separate from the land.
a. Again, all of the conveyance
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problems surrounding the transfering
of an interest to use Indian water
rights are applicable to the leasing
situation.
3. Under 25 U.S.C. 415(a), there
exists ample authority to lease appurtenant
reserved water rights for energy development on Indian lands.
a. Any such lease of Indian water
would have to comply with the law concerning
change of use. See generally Ranquist,
The Effect of Changes in Place and Nature
of Use of Indian Water Rights to Water
Reserved Under the "Winters Doctrine."
5 Nat. Resources Law 34 (1972).
D. The right of Indian tribes to
exchange their right to the use of water
with third parties.
1. In Walton, supra, at 49, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Finally, we note that permitting
the Indians to determine how to use
reserved water is consistent with
the general purpose for the creation
of an Indian reservation--providing
a homeland for the survival and
growth of the Indians and their
way of life.
X-29

a. Just how much discretion
Indian tribes will have in determining
how to utilize their water rights
will be left to the courts to decide
on a case by case basis unless Congress
enacts a law authorizing the sale, lease
or exchange of Indian water rights.
b.

In any exchange agreement,

Indian tribes will have to overcome the
same problems of conveyance and third
party rights discussed supra.
2. Exchange agreements have been
discussed in the context of deferral
agreements. These so called "deferral
agreements" also present difficult
problems. Under such arrangements, Indian
tribes receive consideration for agreeing
not to utilize their water rights by,
for example, not irrigating portions of
their reservations for a period of time,
thereby making water available for uses
by non-Indians. See Clyde, Special
Considerations Involving Indian Rights,
8 Nat. Resources Law. 237, 250-51 (1975)
(describing the Ute Indian Tribe's deferral
agreement).
a. One critical question is whether
this kind of undertaking would be
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considered a "conveyance" within the
meaning of the Nonintercourse Act.
25 U.S.C. §177. See United States v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676,
697-99 (9th Cir. 1976). If it is a
conveyance, federal consent would be
necessary and there is no statute
authorizing approval of such an agreement.
b. Another issue is whether tribal
constitutionsor other governing documents
empower the tribal council or other tribal
authority to negotiate and execute this
type of agreement. This agreement might
also have to satisfy the procedural
requirements of 25 U.S.C. §81, which
concerns contracts with Indian tribes.
Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1927); Green v. Menominee
Tribe, 233 U.S. 558, 569-71 (1914);
United States v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 543 F.2d 676, 697 (9th Cir. 1976);
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
Escondido Mutual Water Co., No. 69-217-S
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1980).
3. It is my opinion that exchange
agreements will be utilized more and more
as people in water short areas attempt to
obtain a firm water supply for energy
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development.
V. Conclusion.
a. Although there are no statutes
specifically authorizing Indian tribes
to sell, lease or exchange Indian water
rights, there exists sufficient authority
to make agreements within the limits
of existing law.
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